Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-165

(b) For the purposes of this section, (1) “scope of employment” includes but is not limited to, (A) representation by an attorney appointed by the Public Defender Services Commission as a public defender, assistant public defender or deputy assistant public defender or an attorney appointed by the court as Division of Public Defender Services assigned counsel of an indigent accused or of a child on a petition of delinquency, (B) representation by such other attorneys, referred to in section 4-141 , of state officers and employees in actions brought against such officers and employees in their official and individual capacities, (C) the discharge of duties as a trustee of the state employees retirement system, (D) the discharge of duties of a commissioner of the Superior Court hearing small claims matters or acting as a fact-finder, arbitrator or magistrate or acting in any other quasi-judicial position, (E) the discharge of duties of a person appointed to a committee established by law for the purpose of rendering services to the Judicial Department, including, but not limited to, the Legal Specialization Screening Committee, the State-Wide Grievance Committee, the Client Security Fund Committee, the advisory committee appointed pursuant to section 51-81d and the State Bar Examining Committee, (F) military duty performed by the armed forces of the state while under state active duty, and (G) representation by an individual appointed by the Public Defender Services Commission, or by the court, as a guardian ad litem or attorney for a party in a neglect, abuse, termination of parental rights, delinquency or family with service needs proceeding; provided the actions described in subparagraphs (A) to (G), inclusive, of this subdivision arise out of the discharge of the duties or within the scope of employment of such officers or employees, and (2) “state employee” includes a member or employee of the soil and water district boards established pursuant to section 22a-315 .

See Sec. 5-141d re indemnification of state officers and employees.

See Sec. 10-235 re indemnification of teachers and certain educational board members and employees.

Section does not apply to teachers in local school systems. 180 C. 96. Specific language of statute prevails over general language of Sec. 31-293a as applied to fellow state employees. 185 C. 616. Cited. 186 C. 300; 187 C. 53. Issue of unconstitutionality of statute not resolved at this time because it was not properly before the court. 189 C. 550. Cited. 209 C. 679; 210 C. 531; 229 C. 479; 234 C. 539. Plaintiffs in their role as foster parents were “employees” of the state as that term is used in section. 238 C. 146. Wanton, reckless or malicious actions are of highly unreasonable conduct, a vast departure from what is viewed as ordinary care and without concern of risk of safety to others or the disregarding of other's rights. 253 C. 134. Action against police officers for alleged misconduct while they sought to arrest plaintiff, execute search warrant and conduct search was barred by immunity provision of section because such actions were within the scope of the officers' employment and plaintiff did not show that their conduct was wanton, reckless or malicious. 261 C. 372. Provision of statutory immunity to state employees has twofold purpose: To avoid placing a burden on state employment and to make clear that remedy available to plaintiff who has suffered harm from negligence of a state employee acting in the scope of his or her employment must bring a claim under the provisions of chapter. 265 C. 301. Trial court properly granted motion to strike negligence action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; defendant had statutory immunity because she was performing one of her job duties at the time of the collision; Secs. 27-70 and 4-142(2) do not negate the statutory immunity afforded a state employee under this section. 297 C. 317.
must bring a claim under the provisions of chapter. 265 C. 301. Trial court properly granted motion to strike negligence action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; defendant had statutory immunity because she was performing one of her job duties at the time of the collision; Secs. 27-70 and 4-142(2) do not negate the statutory immunity afforded a state employee under this section. 297 C. 317.

Cited. 12 CA 449; 40 CA 460. Where plaintiff's suit against a state officer was dismissed due to immunity under section, the two-year statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies in subsequent suit against state and the exception under Sec. 52-593 for failure to name the right person as defendant does not apply. 62 CA 545. If defendant has established a defense of sovereign immunity, it is not necessary to demonstrate compliance with section. 64 CA 433. Standard in statute is inapplicable because liability under statute only applies when defendant has not established a defense of sovereign immunity. 67 CA 613. Defendants cannot avail themselves of immunity under section when they acted intentionally to underreport plaintiff's qualifications for tenure position at state university. 69 CA 106. Common law sovereign immunity does not bar claim against state agency where suit is brought under statute against state officers and employees in their personal capacity. 74 CA 264. Court's denial of motion for summary judgment, as it relates to claim that statutory immunity is a protection against liability for actions in individual capacity, is an immediately appealable final judgment. 94 CA 103. In action brought against defendants in their official capacities, trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of statutory immunity, which applies when claims are brought against state employees acting in their individual capacities; only immunity defense available to defendants was sovereign immunity. 96 CA 123. Trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's action against defendants, chief of habeas corpus services, director of special public defenders, and a special public defender, on the basis of sovereign immunity. 98 CA 333. Exception to statutory immunity for wanton, reckless or malicious conduct requires sufficient pleading of relevant facts. 154 CA 592.

Cited. 33 CS 546.

Cited. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 119.