Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-906
This is the official text of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-906, part of Nebraska’s Rev. Stat — part of the compiled statutory law of Nebraska, published by the state as "Rev. Stat." Browse the sections below, each linked to its official government source.
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View Statute 13-906
Official statutory text
No suit shall be permitted under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act and sections 16-727 , 16-728 , 23-175 , 39-809 , and 79-610 unless the governing body of the political subdivision has made final disposition of the claim, except that if the governing body does not make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed, the claimant may, by notice in writing, withdraw the claim from consideration of the governing body and begin suit under such act and sections.
Laws 1969, c. 138, § 5, p. 629;
R.S.1943, (1983), § 23-2405;
Laws 1996, LB 900, § 1022.
Because compliance with the statutory time limits set forth in this section can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
Because compliance with the statutory time limits set forth in this section can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
In conjunction with section 25-2221 and section 49-801(13), a political subdivision has until the end of the last day of the 6-month period after a claimant has filed a tort claim upon which to make a final disposition of such claim. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
In conjunction with section 25-2221 and section 49-801(13), a political subdivision has until the end of the last day of the 6-month period after a claimant has filed a tort claim upon which to make a final disposition of such claim. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "within six months" includes the last day of the 6-month time period. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "within six months" includes the last day of the 6-month time period. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The word "month" as used in this section means calendar month. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The word "month" as used in this section means calendar month. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
Because compliance with the statutory time limit can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application to this section. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Because compliance with the statutory time limit can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application to this section. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Noncompliance with this section must be pled as an affirmative defense. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Noncompliance with this section must be pled as an affirmative defense. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Absent any consideration of the statute of limitations, filing of a petition is substantial compliance with the terms of this section as to the withdrawal of a claim from consideration. Malzahn v. Transit Authority, 244 Neb. 425, 507 N.W.2d 289 (1993).
Absent any consideration of the statute of limitations, filing of a petition is substantial compliance with the terms of this section as to the withdrawal of a claim from consideration. Malzahn v. Transit Authority, 244 Neb. 425, 507 N.W.2d 289 (1993).
Substantial compliance with this section is sufficient when a lack of precise compliance has caused no prejudice to the political subdivision. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 11 Neb. App. 498, 654 N.W.2d 383 (2002).
Substantial compliance with this section is sufficient when a lack of precise compliance has caused no prejudice to the political subdivision. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 11 Neb. App. 498, 654 N.W.2d 383 (2002).
Laws 1969, c. 138, § 5, p. 629;
R.S.1943, (1983), § 23-2405;
Laws 1996, LB 900, § 1022.
Because compliance with the statutory time limits set forth in this section can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
Because compliance with the statutory time limits set forth in this section can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
In conjunction with section 25-2221 and section 49-801(13), a political subdivision has until the end of the last day of the 6-month period after a claimant has filed a tort claim upon which to make a final disposition of such claim. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
In conjunction with section 25-2221 and section 49-801(13), a political subdivision has until the end of the last day of the 6-month period after a claimant has filed a tort claim upon which to make a final disposition of such claim. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "within six months" includes the last day of the 6-month time period. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "within six months" includes the last day of the 6-month time period. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The word "month" as used in this section means calendar month. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
The word "month" as used in this section means calendar month. Geddes v. York County, 273 Neb. 271, 729 N.W.2d 661 (2007).
Because compliance with the statutory time limit can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application to this section. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Because compliance with the statutory time limit can be determined with precision, the doctrine of substantial compliance has no application to this section. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Noncompliance with this section must be pled as an affirmative defense. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Noncompliance with this section must be pled as an affirmative defense. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 266 Neb. 750, 669 N.W.2d 63 (2003).
Absent any consideration of the statute of limitations, filing of a petition is substantial compliance with the terms of this section as to the withdrawal of a claim from consideration. Malzahn v. Transit Authority, 244 Neb. 425, 507 N.W.2d 289 (1993).
Absent any consideration of the statute of limitations, filing of a petition is substantial compliance with the terms of this section as to the withdrawal of a claim from consideration. Malzahn v. Transit Authority, 244 Neb. 425, 507 N.W.2d 289 (1993).
Substantial compliance with this section is sufficient when a lack of precise compliance has caused no prejudice to the political subdivision. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 11 Neb. App. 498, 654 N.W.2d 383 (2002).
Substantial compliance with this section is sufficient when a lack of precise compliance has caused no prejudice to the political subdivision. Big Crow v. City of Rushville, 11 Neb. App. 498, 654 N.W.2d 383 (2002).
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