N.Y. FCT Law § 413-B
This is the official text of N.Y. FCT Law § 413-B, part of New York’s FCT Law — part of the compiled statutory law of New York, published by the state as "FCT Law." Browse the sections below, each linked to its official government source.
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Support orders for certain adult dependents
Official statutory text
§ 413-b. Support orders for certain adult dependents. 1.\nNotwithstanding any other law, a person who would otherwise be\nchargeable under law with support of a minor child is also chargeable\nwith the support of any such individual until such individual reaches\nthe age of twenty-six, when it shall appear to the satisfaction of the\ncourt that the person is developmentally disabled as defined under\nsubdivision twenty-two of section 1.03 of the mental hygiene law,\nresides with the person seeking such support, and is principally\ndependent on such person for maintenance. A finding of a developmental\ndisability shall be supported by a diagnosis and accompanying report of\na physician, licensed psychologist, registered professional nurse,\nlicensed clinical social worker or a licensed master social worker under\nthe supervision of a physician, psychologist or licensed clinical social\nworker authorized to practice under title eight of the education law,\nand acting within their lawful scope of practice.\n 2. Upon petition brought by the parent or kinship caregiver of an\nadult child with a disability, the court shall make its award for\nsupport for such individual with a developmental disability in\naccordance with the provisions of subdivision one of section four\nhundred thirteen of this part. In addition to the provisions of\nsubdivision one of section four hundred thirteen of this part, the court\nmay consider whether the financial responsibility of caring for the\nindividual has been unreasonably placed on one parent when determining\nthe child support obligation. The duration of time the court may use\nwhen considering this factor shall be limited to the time period from\nwhen the child turned twenty-one until the individual turns twenty-six.\nIf a child support order ended at the age of eighteen then such time\nperiod shall be from when the child turned eighteen until the individual\nturns twenty-six.\n 3. The court has jurisdiction to determine proceedings brought by\npetition and order to show cause, for the determination of support of\nsuch dependents, as well as to enforce or modify orders or judgments.\n 4. The court shall have discretion to order the payor party to make\nsupport payments either to the petitioner or to the trustee of an\n"exception trust" as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(A) and (C), clause\n(iii) of subparagraph two of paragraph (b) of subdivision two of section\nthree hundred sixty-six of the social services law, and section 7-1.12\nof the estates, powers and trusts law if such direction would assist in\nmaximizing assistance to the child.\n 5. Except where inconsistent with this section, all provisions of this\narticle relating to orders of child support shall apply to all orders of\nsupport for adults with developmental disabilities; provided, however,\nthat such orders shall not be eligible for services pursuant to section\none hundred eleven-g of the social services law.\n 6. A determination made pursuant to this section that the person is or\nis not developmentally disabled, as defined in subdivision twenty-two of\nsection 1.03 of the mental hygiene law, shall not be binding on the\nstate, a local government or the person for any other purpose, including\ndeterminations of eligibility for services authorized by the office for\npeople with developmental disabilities.\n
Status: in_force · Read it on the official government site
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