Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465
This is the official text of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465, part of Connecticut’s Gen. Stat — part of the compiled statutory law of Connecticut, published by the state as "Gen. Stat." Browse the sections below, each linked to its official government source.
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Sec. 7-465. Assumption of liability for damage caused by employee of municipality or member of local emergency planning district. Joint liability of municipalities in district department of health or regional council of governments.
Official statutory text
(b) Each town, city or borough which has joined with other towns, cities or boroughs to form a district department of health, pursuant to chapter 368f, or a regional council of governments, pursuant to section 4-124j , shall jointly assume the liability imposed upon any officer, agent or employee of such district department of health or such regional council of governments, acting in the performance of his duties and in the scope of his employment, under, and in the manner and in accordance with the procedures set forth in, subsection (a) of this section. Such joint assumption of liability shall be proportionately shared by the towns, cities and boroughs in such district or regional council of governments, on the same basis that the expenses of such district are shared as determined under section 19a-243 .
See Sec. 7-101a re indemnification of municipal officers and employees.
See Sec. 10-235 re indemnification of school personnel.
See Sec. 52-557n re liability of an employee, officer or agent of a political subdivision of the state.
A complaint brought under section should be in two counts, one alleging facts essential to legal liability of employee, and the other facts essential to legal liability of municipality under section; since interests of municipality and employee may be antagonistic, they should be represented by separate counsel. 148 C. 27. Municipality may not be held liable unless employee himself becomes obligated to pay for damages. 151 C. 402. Plaintiff who was injured by negligence of fellow employee who had a right to workmen's compensation before 1961 amendment became effective was not barred from bringing a common law action against his fellow employee. 152 C. 42. Cited. 159 C. 509; 167 C. 464, 471. Municipal employee has no cause of action against a fellow municipal employee to recover damages for an injury caused by the act of such fellow employee while both are engaged within the scope of their employment if such injured employee is covered by workmen's compensation unless the act causing such injury was willful or malicious. 169 C. 630. Cited. 173 C. 52; Id., 203; 178 C. 520; 187 C. 53; Id., 147; 189 C. 601. Statute does not cover infringement of civil rights cases where infringement by municipal employee is alleged to have occurred before effective date of statute covering such transactions. 190 C. 77. Cited. 191 C. 77; 204 C. 435; 209 C. 273; 218 C. 531; 219 C. 179; 221 C. 149; Id., 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653; 225 C. 177; Id., 217; 229 C. 716; Id., 829; 237 C. 501; 239 C. 708. Checking to see whether required zoning permits have been obtained and filed and inspections to determine whether a property conforms to regulations and codes are discretionary acts and municipal immunity attaches where no exception applies. 297 C. 297.
79; 221 C. 149; Id., 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653; 225 C. 177; Id., 217; 229 C. 716; Id., 829; 237 C. 501; 239 C. 708. Checking to see whether required zoning permits have been obtained and filed and inspections to determine whether a property conforms to regulations and codes are discretionary acts and municipal immunity attaches where no exception applies. 297 C. 297.
Cited. 4 CA 216; 12 CA 538; judgment reversed, see 209 C. 273; 16 CA 213; Id., 803; 18 CA 515; 20 CA 439; 24 CA 592; 28 CA 272; 30 CA 594; 31 CA 235; 32 CA 373; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 829; 36 CA 601; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; 38 CA 546. Statute does not apply to plaintiff's allegations of breach of contract, nuisance and violation of state constitution and various local statutes made directly against defendant borough. 53 CA 791. Although trial court improperly analyzed plaintiff's claims under Sec. 52-557n(a), which concerns claims brought directly against a municipality, rather than under the applicable municipal indemnification statute (Sec. 7-465), which provides that qualified municipal immunity does not apply to claims for indemnification for acts by municipal employees unless the acts are willful or wanton, she could not prevail on her claim that trial court improperly granted motion for a directed verdict because there is no recognized right to a claim for emotional distress resulting to a person from loss of a pet. 84 CA 395. Defendant's pleadings met standard for summary judgment; court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground of municipal immunity because plaintiffs brought suit under section without also suing a municipal employee or agent. 87 CA 353.
Cited. 19 CS 395; 21 CS 193. A broadside allegation of negligence on part of “agents and servants” of defendant, a town, was insufficient to bring an action within purview of statute; to make statute one of indemnification, applicable recovery must be had against specific employees of a town for specific acts covered by statute, and all statutory conditions, including notice, must be met. 22 CS 239. Plaintiff must allege and prove, as to both defendant employee and defendant municipality, due care or freedom from contributory negligence. 23 CS 130; Id., 133. Cited. Id., 152. Municipal employee is not relieved from consequences of his own negligence even though his employer may be exempt; furthermore, he is not indemnified under section unless complaint is drawn so as to invoke section; even if municipality is immune under section from liability for negligence, it may be liable in nuisance. Id., 158. Burden of alleging and proving contributory negligence remains with defendant employee as provided in Sec. 52-114; plaintiff not obliged to allege due care; because interests of municipality and employee may be antagonistic, each should be represented by independent counsel. Id., 228. Under former section, notice to employee and municipality was condition precedent to bringing action against both. 25 CS 70. Where plaintiff brought action under statute against local board of education to recover for injuries resulting from school bus accident, held action should have been brought under Sec. 13a-149; complaint under statute should be in two counts: The first, alleging the facts essential to the legal liability of the employee and the second, the facts essential to the legal liability of the municipality under the statute; in action under former statute, it may appear that interests of municipality and its employee are antagonistic and therefore they should be represented by independent counsel; to establish liability of municipality under statute, plaintiff must prove compliance with requirements as to demand and notice. Id., 302. In count directed against municipality, it is necessary to allege the conduct of the employee was not willful or wanton. Id., 339. History discussed. 26 CS 83. Sec
nd its employee are antagonistic and therefore they should be represented by independent counsel; to establish liability of municipality under statute, plaintiff must prove compliance with requirements as to demand and notice. Id., 302. In count directed against municipality, it is necessary to allege the conduct of the employee was not willful or wanton. Id., 339. History discussed. 26 CS 83. Sec. 52-114, establishing presumption of due care on part of injured person, is applicable to suit against town and its employee under this section. 28 CS 506. Statute was not intended to enlarge the liability of the municipality for the acts or omissions of its employees in courses of action in which they would not formerly have been liable; obligation of town employee, once established against him, shall be assumed by town; employee against whom action is brought is indemnified by town if cause arose while he was performing his duties and within the scope of employment. 29 CS 74. Validation by legislature of a late notice held valid although section cited was incorrect; legislative intent held to be to subject municipal employees and municipalities by way of indemnification for discretionary as well as ministerial acts performed within the scope of employment. 31 CS 442. City not liable for nonfeasance of its police officers where the duty owed is to the public as a whole rather than to the plaintiff individually. 32 CS 258. Written notice of intent to sue municipality and of time and place where alleged damages occurred must be filed with clerk of municipality within 6 months from date cause of action accrued. 33 CS 197. Cited. 39 CS 102; 41 CS 420; Id., 548; 42 CS 22. Town's liability is dependent on and derivative of finding of negligence on the part of municipal employee. 49 CS 15.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 616, 622, 623. Sec. 52-557n precludes joint action seeking damages against municipality and its officers under this section. 219 C. 179.
Cited. 3 CA 343; 30 CA 742. Except for indemnification actions, statute does not permit separate cause of action to be brought against a town, and in this case, plaintiff could not prevail on grounds that town failed to give timely notice of intent to represent both the municipality and employee. 85 CA 383.
See Sec. 7-101a re indemnification of municipal officers and employees.
See Sec. 10-235 re indemnification of school personnel.
See Sec. 52-557n re liability of an employee, officer or agent of a political subdivision of the state.
A complaint brought under section should be in two counts, one alleging facts essential to legal liability of employee, and the other facts essential to legal liability of municipality under section; since interests of municipality and employee may be antagonistic, they should be represented by separate counsel. 148 C. 27. Municipality may not be held liable unless employee himself becomes obligated to pay for damages. 151 C. 402. Plaintiff who was injured by negligence of fellow employee who had a right to workmen's compensation before 1961 amendment became effective was not barred from bringing a common law action against his fellow employee. 152 C. 42. Cited. 159 C. 509; 167 C. 464, 471. Municipal employee has no cause of action against a fellow municipal employee to recover damages for an injury caused by the act of such fellow employee while both are engaged within the scope of their employment if such injured employee is covered by workmen's compensation unless the act causing such injury was willful or malicious. 169 C. 630. Cited. 173 C. 52; Id., 203; 178 C. 520; 187 C. 53; Id., 147; 189 C. 601. Statute does not cover infringement of civil rights cases where infringement by municipal employee is alleged to have occurred before effective date of statute covering such transactions. 190 C. 77. Cited. 191 C. 77; 204 C. 435; 209 C. 273; 218 C. 531; 219 C. 179; 221 C. 149; Id., 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653; 225 C. 177; Id., 217; 229 C. 716; Id., 829; 237 C. 501; 239 C. 708. Checking to see whether required zoning permits have been obtained and filed and inspections to determine whether a property conforms to regulations and codes are discretionary acts and municipal immunity attaches where no exception applies. 297 C. 297.
79; 221 C. 149; Id., 256; decision reconsidered and overruled, see 238 C. 653; 225 C. 177; Id., 217; 229 C. 716; Id., 829; 237 C. 501; 239 C. 708. Checking to see whether required zoning permits have been obtained and filed and inspections to determine whether a property conforms to regulations and codes are discretionary acts and municipal immunity attaches where no exception applies. 297 C. 297.
Cited. 4 CA 216; 12 CA 538; judgment reversed, see 209 C. 273; 16 CA 213; Id., 803; 18 CA 515; 20 CA 439; 24 CA 592; 28 CA 272; 30 CA 594; 31 CA 235; 32 CA 373; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 829; 36 CA 601; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; 38 CA 546. Statute does not apply to plaintiff's allegations of breach of contract, nuisance and violation of state constitution and various local statutes made directly against defendant borough. 53 CA 791. Although trial court improperly analyzed plaintiff's claims under Sec. 52-557n(a), which concerns claims brought directly against a municipality, rather than under the applicable municipal indemnification statute (Sec. 7-465), which provides that qualified municipal immunity does not apply to claims for indemnification for acts by municipal employees unless the acts are willful or wanton, she could not prevail on her claim that trial court improperly granted motion for a directed verdict because there is no recognized right to a claim for emotional distress resulting to a person from loss of a pet. 84 CA 395. Defendant's pleadings met standard for summary judgment; court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground of municipal immunity because plaintiffs brought suit under section without also suing a municipal employee or agent. 87 CA 353.
Cited. 19 CS 395; 21 CS 193. A broadside allegation of negligence on part of “agents and servants” of defendant, a town, was insufficient to bring an action within purview of statute; to make statute one of indemnification, applicable recovery must be had against specific employees of a town for specific acts covered by statute, and all statutory conditions, including notice, must be met. 22 CS 239. Plaintiff must allege and prove, as to both defendant employee and defendant municipality, due care or freedom from contributory negligence. 23 CS 130; Id., 133. Cited. Id., 152. Municipal employee is not relieved from consequences of his own negligence even though his employer may be exempt; furthermore, he is not indemnified under section unless complaint is drawn so as to invoke section; even if municipality is immune under section from liability for negligence, it may be liable in nuisance. Id., 158. Burden of alleging and proving contributory negligence remains with defendant employee as provided in Sec. 52-114; plaintiff not obliged to allege due care; because interests of municipality and employee may be antagonistic, each should be represented by independent counsel. Id., 228. Under former section, notice to employee and municipality was condition precedent to bringing action against both. 25 CS 70. Where plaintiff brought action under statute against local board of education to recover for injuries resulting from school bus accident, held action should have been brought under Sec. 13a-149; complaint under statute should be in two counts: The first, alleging the facts essential to the legal liability of the employee and the second, the facts essential to the legal liability of the municipality under the statute; in action under former statute, it may appear that interests of municipality and its employee are antagonistic and therefore they should be represented by independent counsel; to establish liability of municipality under statute, plaintiff must prove compliance with requirements as to demand and notice. Id., 302. In count directed against municipality, it is necessary to allege the conduct of the employee was not willful or wanton. Id., 339. History discussed. 26 CS 83. Sec
nd its employee are antagonistic and therefore they should be represented by independent counsel; to establish liability of municipality under statute, plaintiff must prove compliance with requirements as to demand and notice. Id., 302. In count directed against municipality, it is necessary to allege the conduct of the employee was not willful or wanton. Id., 339. History discussed. 26 CS 83. Sec. 52-114, establishing presumption of due care on part of injured person, is applicable to suit against town and its employee under this section. 28 CS 506. Statute was not intended to enlarge the liability of the municipality for the acts or omissions of its employees in courses of action in which they would not formerly have been liable; obligation of town employee, once established against him, shall be assumed by town; employee against whom action is brought is indemnified by town if cause arose while he was performing his duties and within the scope of employment. 29 CS 74. Validation by legislature of a late notice held valid although section cited was incorrect; legislative intent held to be to subject municipal employees and municipalities by way of indemnification for discretionary as well as ministerial acts performed within the scope of employment. 31 CS 442. City not liable for nonfeasance of its police officers where the duty owed is to the public as a whole rather than to the plaintiff individually. 32 CS 258. Written notice of intent to sue municipality and of time and place where alleged damages occurred must be filed with clerk of municipality within 6 months from date cause of action accrued. 33 CS 197. Cited. 39 CS 102; 41 CS 420; Id., 548; 42 CS 22. Town's liability is dependent on and derivative of finding of negligence on the part of municipal employee. 49 CS 15.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 185 C. 616, 622, 623. Sec. 52-557n precludes joint action seeking damages against municipality and its officers under this section. 219 C. 179.
Cited. 3 CA 343; 30 CA 742. Except for indemnification actions, statute does not permit separate cause of action to be brought against a town, and in this case, plaintiff could not prevail on grounds that town failed to give timely notice of intent to represent both the municipality and employee. 85 CA 383.
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